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PART 1: GENERAL INFORMATION 
A. Introduction 
The purpose of this Bench Memorandum is to provide judges in the Niagara 
Moot Court Competition a summary of the basic factual and legal issues in the 
2014 Niagara Problem (the “Compromis”). This Bench Memorandum should be 
read in conjunction with the teams’ briefs that you are judging; the Compromis, 
which is in essence a stipulation of facts agreed to by the two Parties; and the 
Corrections/Clarifications which supplements the Compromis. The Compromis 
is intended to present the competitors with a balanced problem, such that each 
side has strengths and weaknesses in its case. This Bench Memorandum is not 
meant to be an exhaustive treatise on the legal issues raised in the Compromis, 
and Judges should not be surprised when, in evaluating either a Brief or an oral 
argument, they see arguments or authorities not discussed in this memorandum. 
Their absence from this Bench Memorandum does not suggest that such 
arguments are not relevant or credible. 
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B. Synopsis of the Facts 
The 2014 Niagara Moot Court Case concerns two issues: First, whether an 
obligation exists under international law to recognize same-sex marriage. And 
second, the extent to which a state may assert its right to protect itself from 
terrorism by freezing the sale of a yacht where the proceeds were intended to pay 
a ransom to pirates. 
 
Sam Chandra and Bill Hayter’s Domestic Partnership 
Sam Chandra met Bill Hayter while Sam was studying at Portland State 
University in 2005. The two quickly hit it off and moved in together just a few 
months after their relationship began. When Chandra graduated from PSU, 
Hayter offered him a position as a finance officer with Hayter’s successful home 
renovation business, Hayter Homes Ltd. Chandra and Hayter shared living 
expenses and divided chores amongst each other at their home. They hiked, 
biked, and canoed together, and often hosted a mix of their gay and straight 
friends over for dinners and parties. The couple also purchased a 22-foot mono-
hull sailboat, which they named The Oscar Wilde, and they would often spend 
their weekends sailing the through the waters of the Columbia River. The Oscar 
Wilde was registered and flagged a U.S. vessel. 
In March 2007, Hayter proposed to Chandra at a fundraiser for the Portland 
Art Museum. The couple went to obtain a marriage license from the Clerk of 
Multnomah Country, but were denied based on a 2004 amendment to the Oregon 
Constitution. “Measure 36” amended the constitution so that only marriages 
between one man and one woman were considered legally recognized. In 2007, 
however, the Oregon state legislature passed the Family Fairness Act, which 
created the status of “domestic partnership” and granted certain rights to same-
sex couples who registered under the Act. Chandra and Hayter registered their 
relationship under the Act in March 2008. While the Oregon Constitution still 
did not recognize same-sex couples as legally wed, those in a domestic 
partnership were granted the right to make medical decisions in crises, to 
exercise rights and responsibilities related to property and inheritance, and to 
benefit from provisions to protect children and other dependents. 
Following a downturn in the Oregon economy, Chandra and Hayter 
relocated to Vancouver, British Columbia. 
 
The Freeze on the Sale of The Oscar Wilde 
In May 2013, Chandra and Hayter were spending the night aboard The 
Oscar Wilde in international waters. At some point in the night, Hayter awoke to 
investigate a noise and was abducted by masked men who had boarded the ship. 
Chandra awoke to find Hayter missing, and immediately contacted the Canadian 
Coast Guard to search for him. 
Two weeks after Hayter’s disappearance, Chandra received an email from 
“Moses Andrew,” an individual who identified himself as a member of the Namian 
Liberation Front (NLF). Andrew informed Chandra that Hayter was alive and 
healthy, but demanded Chandra pay a U.S. $5 million ransom. The NLF is an 
organization working towards the creation of an independent state out of the 
4
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Namian Islands, which is currently part of the Republic of Minasia. In pursuit of 
this goal, the NLF has blown up bridges and buildings throughout Minasia and has 
been implicated in attacks in the Harjuro, the country’s capital. The organization 
has been designated a terrorist organization on lists maintained by Public Safety 
Canada and the U.S. State Department. The NLF also maintains close ties with 
Somali pirates. The two groups have been known to conduct training and 
information exchange sessions together, and have been implicated in joint attacks 
on vessels. 
In an effort to raise money for the ransom, Chandra set up a web-based 
appeal and considered selling The Oscar Wilde. Upon hearing of Chandra’s 
fundraising, the U.S. Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC) froze the sale of 
ship and stated that any private efforts to contribute money would be contrary to 
international law. OFAC instituted its actions because it believed the ransom 
payment and the proceeds from The Oscar Wilde would materially assist 
terrorists in contravention to international law. Canada issued a Diplomatic Note 
asserting that OFAC’s actions were unwarranted, but the U.S. rejected this, 
stating that every country has a right to protect itself from terrorists. 
Additionally, Canada issued a Diplomatic Note to the United Stated asserting 
that the U.S. had breached international law by failing to issue a marriage license 
to Chandra and Hayter. The U.S. responded that every nation has the right to 
establish what the pre-conditions for marriage are. 
After high-level negotiations in late July 2013 failed, Canada and the United 
States agreed in August 2013 to submit the disputes about the marriage licenses 
and OFAC’s blocking of The Oscar Wilde to a special chamber of the ICJ. Both 
countries further agreed that they would fully and immediately implement 
whatever decision the ICJ renders in the case. 
C. Sources of International Law 
This section is an introduction to public international law for judges who 
might not have professional experience or training in the field. Feel free to skip 
to Section IV if you have judged International Law Moot Courts in the past 
and/or feel that you have a good familiarity with the general principles of 
international law. There are important distinctions between international law and 
domestic legal systems. The most significant for the international law moot 
judge is the rigid definition of what sources of law are acceptable before the 
Court. 
1. General 
The conduct and rules of the International Court of Justice (the “ICJ”) are 
governed by the Statute of the International Court of Justice (the “ICJ Statute”). 
Under Article 38(1) of its Statute, the International Court of Justice may consider 
the following sources of international law in order to decide disputes before it: 
 
a) international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing 
rules expressly recognized by the contesting States; 
b) international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; 
5
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c) the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; 
d) judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified 
publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of 
rules of law. 
 
Commentators disagree as to whether these sources are listed in order of 
importance. 
Judges from common-law systems should note the status of precedent. 
Article 59 of the ICJ Statute deprives decisions of the Court any status as 
precedent, stating, “[t]he decision of the Court has no binding force except 
between the parties and in respect of that particular case.” In practice, however, 
the ICJ often cites its prior decisions, and those of its predecessor, the Permanent 
Court of International Justice, as persuasive authority, pursuant to Article 
38(1)(d). Additionally, the Court frequently evaluates rules of customary 
international law in its opinions and subsequently relies upon those evaluations 
in later decisions. 
Decisions by other tribunals are dealt with in the discussion in Subsection E 
(“Decisions and Publicists”) infra. 
Resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly are not, of themselves, 
binding before the Court. Although Resolutions may be evidence of customary 
international law, the General Assembly’s position in international law is not 
analogous to that of a domestic legislature, and resolutions of the General 
Assembly do not create positive international law. 
2. Treaties 
Treaties are agreements between and among States, by which parties 
obligate themselves to act, or refrain from acting, according to the terms of the 
treaty. Rules regarding treaty procedure and interpretation are defined in the 1959 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties1 (the “VCLT”), which is accepted by 
both the United States and Canada as customary international law. 
The fundamental principle relating to treaties, reiterated in Article 26 of the 
VCLT, is that of pacta sunt servanda: “Every treaty in force is binding upon the 
parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith.” In other words, once 
a State becomes a party to a treaty, it is bound by that treaty. Article 27 of the 
VCLT provides that a State cannot plead its Constitution, domestic laws, or 
domestic court cases as an excuse for non performance of a treaty obligation. 
Article 34 of the VCLT adds that a treaty is generally not binding on a State 
which is not party to the treaty, and does not create rights or obligations for such 
a State. Article 18 tempers this rule with respect to States that have signed – but 
not yet ratified – a treaty: “A State is obliged to refrain from acts which would 
defeat the object and purpose of a treaty when it has signed the treaty . . . .” 
pending ratification, unless it has “made its intention clear not to become a party 
to the treaty.” For example, a State which has signed but not ratified a treaty 
forbidding testing of nuclear weapons would not be held to the minute procedural 
details of the treaty; however, actual nuclear- weapons testing by the State would 
6
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probably be seen as a violation of international law, constituting a breach of the 
“object and purpose” of the treaty. 
The treaties potentially relevant to this case, to which both Canada and the 
United States are parties, include: the U.N. Charter, the Statute of the International 
Court of Justice, and the 1958 Law of the Sea Conventions. Note, while 
Canada is party to the 1982 UN Law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS), the 
U.S. has signed but not yet ratified the 1982 Convention.1 
Even if a State is not party to a treaty, a treaty may serve as evidence of 
customary international law. Article 38 of the VCLT recognizes this “back-
door” means by which a treaty may become binding on non-parties. Judges 
should be aware, however, that situations arise where some provisions of a treaty 
– for example, many provisions of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention – may 
reflect or codify customary international law, while other parts do not. 
3. Customary International Law 
The second source of international law is customary international law. A rule 
of customary international law is one that, whether or not it has been codified in 
a treaty, has binding force of law because the community of States treats it and 
views it as a rule of law. In contrast to treaty law, a rule of customary 
international law is binding upon a State whether or not it has affirmatively 
assented to that rule. The exception to this is that a State which has been “a 
persistent objector” to the rule of customary international law will not be bound 
by it. 
In order to prove that a given rule has become a rule of customary 
international law, one must prove two elements: widespread state practice and 
opinio juris – the mutual conviction that the recurrence (of state practice) is the 
result of a compulsory rule. 
“State practice” is the material element of customary international law, and 
simply means that a sufficient number of states behave in a regular and repeated 
manner consistent with the customary norm. As alluded to above, State practice 
may also be shown when a sufficient number of States sign, ratify, and accede to 
a convention. There is some dispute among commentators as to whether the 
practice of a small number of states in a particular region can create 
“regional customary international law” or whether the practice of particularly 
affected states, e.g. in the area of space law or antitrust law, can create custom 
that binds states which later become affected by these issues, although the ICJ 
appears to have acknowledged the possibility.2 
Opinio juris is the psychological or subjective element of customary 
international law. It requires that the State action in question be taken out of a 
sense of legal obligation, as opposed to mere expediency. Put another way, 
opinio juris, is the “conviction of a State that it is following a certain practice as 
 
 1 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (1969), https://treaties.
un.org/Pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXIII~1&chapter=23&Temp=
mtdsg 3&lang=en [hereinafter VCLT]. 
 2 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (F.R.G. v. Den.), 1969 I.C.J. 1 (1969). 
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a matter of law and that, were it to depart from the practice, some form of 
sanction would, or ought to, fall on it.”3 
Customary international law is shown by reference to treaties, decisions of 
national and international courts, national legislation, diplomatic 
correspondence, opinions of national legal advisers, and the practice of 
international organizations. Each of these items might be employed as evidence 
of State practice, opinio juris, or both. 
With respect to the burden of proof, in The North Sea Continental Shelf 
Cases, the ICJ stated that the party asserting the existence of a rule of 
customary international law bears the burden of proving the existence of such a 
rule. 
4. General Principles of Law 
The third source of international law consists of “general principles of law.” 
Such principles are gap-filler provisions: on occasion, the ICJ must have 
recourse to rules typically found in domestic legal systems in order to address 
procedural and other issues. 
The bulk of recognized general principles are procedural in nature, for 
example, the laws regarding burden of proof and admissibility of circumstantial 
evidence. Many other principles, for example estoppel, waiver, unclean hands, 
necessity, and force majeure, may sound to a common-law practitioner like 
equitable doctrines. The principle of general equity in the interpretation of legal 
documents and legal relationships is one of the most widely cited general principles 
of international law. The ICJ has upheld the application of equitable principles 
generally in, among other cases, the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (1969). 
Its predecessor, the Permanent Court of International Justice, recognized 
equitable principles as part and parcel of international law in The Diversion of 
Water from the Meuse.4 
It is important to note, however, that “equity” in this sense is a source of 
international law, brought before the Court under Article 38(1)(c) of the Statute 
of the ICJ. It is an inter legem application of equitable principles, and not a 
power of the Court to decide the merits of the case ex aequo et bono, a separate 
matter treated under Article 38(2) of the Statute. 
5. Decisions and Publicists 
The final source of international law is judicial decisions and teachings of 
scholars. This category is described as “a subsidiary means of finding the law.” 
Judicial decisions and scholarly writings are, in essence, research aids for the 
Court, used for example to support or refute the existence of a customary norm, 
to clarify the bounds of a general principle or customary rule, or to demonstrate 
state practice under a treaty. 
Judicial decisions, whether from international tribunals or from domestic 
courts, are useful to the extent they address international law directly or 
demonstrate a general principle. 
 
 3 MARK E. VILLIGER, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TREATIES 4 (1985). 
 4 1937 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 70, at 76-78. 
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“Teachings” refers simply to the writings of learned scholars. Many student 
competitors make the mistake of believing that every single published article 
constitutes an Article 38(1)(d) “teaching.” However, the provision is expressly 
limited to teachings of “the most highly qualified publicists.” For international 
law generally, this is a very short list, and includes names like Grotius, 
Lauterpacht, and Brownlie. Within the context of a specific field of international 
law – for example, environmental law or law of the sea – there are additional 
experts who would be regarded within their field as “highly qualified publicists.” 
D. Burdens of Proof 
In the Corfu Channel Case5, the ICJ set out the burdens of proof applicable to 
cases before it. The Applicant (in this case Canada) normally carries the burden 
of proof with respect to factual allegations contained in its claim, by a 
preponderance of the evidence. In the case of counter- claims (the second issue 
in the present case), the Respondent (here the United States) bears the burden of 
proof. 
Participants cannot, however, be held responsible for the lack of information 
in the Compromis. They can only be held responsible for the quality of their 
argument in light of the lack of detail. Judges should not dwell on the 
evidentiary gaps unless the competitors have themselves drawn implausible or 
unsupportable inferences. 
PART II: LEGAL ANALYSIS 
A. The United States’ Obligation Under International Law to Provide for Same-Sex 
Marriage 
This issue raises three main questions: First, does the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”) extend the right of marriage 
to same-sex couples? Second, how should Article 23(2) of the ICCPR be 
interpreted? Third, does customary international law require the United States 
(U.S.) to recognize the right of same-sex couples to marry? 
1. Does the ICCPR extend the right of marriage to same-sex couples? 
Under the ICCPR, discrimination is barred on any ground including “race, 
color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
property, birth or other status.”6 While state parties are primarily responsible for 
enforcement of the ICCPR, the Covenant also established the Human Rights 
Committee (“HRCttee”) as a secondary enforcement mechanism that can be 
utilized at the international level after all domestic remedies have been 
exhausted. 7  Although HRCttee decisions do not constitute mandatory legal 
judgments, the decisions resemble judicial decisions in format, and are 
 
 5 Corfu Channel Case (Merits) (Br. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. Rep. 4. 
 6 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 2(1), Dec. 16, 1966, 999 
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
 7 Id. art. 28. 
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considered persuasive authority. Furthermore, the HRCttee is the authority for 
interpreting the rights in the ICCPR.8 
The HRCttee has not taken an entirely uniform approach in interpreting the 
articles that are understood to address sexual orientation and same-sex marriage. 
For instance, ICCPR Article 26 states that “all persons are equal before the 
law . . . without any discrimination . . on any ground such as race, colour, sex, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, 
birth or other status.” In Toonen v. Australia, the HRCttee held that “sexual 
orientation” is included in the reference to “sex” in Article 26, effectively making 
sexual orientation a protected class.9 In Young v. Australia, the HRCttee held that 
Australia violated article 26 of the ICCPR by denying Young a pension on the 
basis of his sex or sexual orientation. 10  In X v. Colombia, the HRCttee 
similarly found that Colombia violated article 26 by failing to present a 
reasonable and objective basis for distinguishing between unmarried 
heterosexual couples and homosexual couples for the purpose of pension 
benefits.11 
Two members of the HRCttee joined in a separate dissenting opinion, 
questioning the jurisprudence that reads sexual orientation as a protected class 
under the ICCPR.12 
ICCPR Article 23, on the other hand, specifically regards the right to 
marry, and states that: 
“the right of men and women of marriageable age to marry and to 
found a family shall be recognized.”13 
The U.S. may argue that the inclusion of the term “men and women” in the 
article is significant and limits the right of marriage to heterosexual marriages, 
noting that the rest of the ICCPR uses more universal and gender neutral 
terminology. This approach would find some support from Joslin v. New 
Zealand, where the HRCttee held that “mere refusal to provide for marriage 
between homosexual couples” does not violate the ICCPR.14 The HRCttee relied 
in part on the assertion that the term “men and women” in Article 23(2)—rather 
than gender neutral terms used elsewhere in the ICCPR—has been “consistently 
and uniformly understood as indicating” heterosexual marriage.15  Still, since 
more and more countries are recognizing the right of same- sex couples to 
marry, including Canada and parts of the U.S. and Mexico, the “consistent and 
 
 8 YOGESH TIYAGI, THE U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 51 
(2011). 
 9 Toonen v. Australia, Comm. No. 488/1992, U.N. GAOR Hum. Rts Comm., 50th Sess., 
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992/ (1994). 
 10 Young v. Australia, Comm. No. 941/2000, U.N. GAOR Hum. Rts Comm., 78th Sess., 
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/78/D/941/2000 (2003). 
 11 X v. Colombia, Comm. 1361/2005, U.N. GAOR Hum. Rts Comm., 89th Sess., U.N. 
Doc. CCPR/C/89/D/1361/2005 (2007). 
 12 Id. 
 13 ICCPR, supra note 6, art. 23(2). 
 14 Joslin v New Zealand, Comm. No. 902/1999, U.N. GAOR Hum. Rts Comm., 75th Sess., 
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/75/D/902/1999 (2002). 
 15 Id. para. 8.2. 
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uniform understanding” of the meaning of article 23(2) discussed in Joslin may no 
longer be valid.16 
2. Interpreting the ICCPR 
The question, then, is how Article 23(2) of the ICCPR is reconciled with the 
broader context of the Covenant given the differing HRCttee approaches. Canada 
may argue that decisions by the HRCttee are not broadly binding. Instead 
Canada may propose interpreting the ICCPR by way of the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties (“VCLT”), which guides interpretation to the “object and 
purpose” of a treaty and requires analysis of text, context, and purpose.17 VCLT 
Art. 31(1) states that a “treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with 
the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in 
the light of its object and purpose.”18 
The preamble of the ICCPR recognizes “the inherent dignity and . . . the equal 
and inalienable rights of all members of the human family.”19  Furthermore, 
Article 26 of the ICCPR provides for the “equal protection” of “all persons.”20 
Canada may use these provisions, along with the VCLT, to show that the ICCPR 
should be interpreted so as to require the recognition of same-sex marriage. 
Even if the U.S. were to concede that HRCtee decisions are not binding, it 
may still argue lex specialis derogate legi generali (the lex specialis maxim) in 
interpreting the ICCPR. The maxim gives precedence to the more specific law, 
here Article 23(2) over the general law, Article 26, because the more specific law 
is supposed to take better account of the context in which the law is to be 
applied. 21  This would imply, then, that the ICCPR does not require the 
recognition of same-sex marriage. The lex specialis maxim, however, is just one 
of a number of interpretive tools to be used.22 
3. Customary International Law 
Canada may attempt to argue that customary international law recognizes 
the rights of same-sex couples to be married. Customary international law is 
binding, and a claim can be brought against a state to conform to custom even if 
that state has qualms with a certain treaty provision. In order to show that a 
norm has crystallized into customary international law, Canada must 
demonstrate the existence of two elements: a widespread and consistent state 
practice and opinio juris (belief that the practice is required by law). Evidence of 
custom can be found, among other sources, in states conforming to treaties and 
states reports to treaty bodies. 
Sexual orientation and same-sex marriage are not explicitly mentioned in 
any of the principal United Nations human rights instruments. There are, 
 
 16 Id. at para. 8.2. 
 17 VCLT, supra note 14, art. 31(1). 
 18 VCLT, supra note 1, art. 31(1). 
 19 ICCPR, supra note 6, preamble. 
 20 Id. at art. 26. 
 21 U.N. International Law Commission, Report of the International Law Commission on 
its Fifty-Eighth Session, 251(7), U.N. Doc. A/61/10 (Jan. 10, 2006). 
 22 Id. at 251(6). 
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however, a number of human rights documents that, despite not explicitly 
mentioning same-sex marriage, reveal custom to protect the right of same-sex 
couples to marry if they so choose. For instance, Article 7 of the Universal 
Declaration on Human Rights (“UDHR”) affords universal equal protection: “All 
are equal before the law and are entitled to equal protection of the law.”23 Article 
12 of the UDHR recognizes the right to privacy: “No one shall be subjected to 
arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence . . . 
Everyone has the right to the protection of law against such interference.”24 
Finally, the right to marry is found in Article 16 of the UDHR: “Men and 
women of full age . . . have the right to marry and to found a family.”25 If 
Canada can use these instruments to demonstrate a widespread practice and 
opinion juris, it may be able to assert a new custom of international law. 
The U.S., however, may argue that the use of gender specific terminology in 
Article 16 limits the right to marriage to opposite sex couples. Furthermore, a 
2011 report on discrimination against LGBT people from the U.N. High 
Commissioner for Human Rights repeated the holding from Joslin that same-sex 
marriage is not an obligation of states.26 
In addition, Canada may make reference to several recent U.N. General 
Assembly resolutions indirectly supportive of LGBT rights.27 The United States 
may point out that none of these have been adopted by a majority of the U.N. 
membership, that a number of counter-resolutions have been put forward by 
blocs of states opposed to LGBT rights, and that in any event, none of the 
resolutions identify U.N. member states as obligated to provide same-sex 
marriage.28 Canada may counter, in turn, that a 2008 French-Dutch Declaration 
in the General Assembly expressing “concern at continued evidence in every 
region of acts of violence and related human rights violations based on sexual 
orientation and gender identity” has received support from 97 countries so far, 
including in March 2009 from the U.S.29 In addition, within the U.N. human 
 
 23 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948). 
 24 Id. 
 25 Id. 
 26 Discriminatory laws and practices and acts of violence against individuals based on 
their sexual orientation and gender identity, Human Rights Council, 19th Sess., para. 68, U.N. 
Doc. A/HRC/19/41 (Nov. 17, 2011). 
 27 See for instance “Extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions”, A/C.3/67/L.36 (9 
Nov. 2012). In addition, in December 2010 the U.N. Secretary General, Ban Ki Moon, 
delivered a landmark speech in which he called for the worldwide decriminalization of 
homosexuality and for other measures to tackle violence and discrimination against LGBT 
people. Since then, the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights has noted 
that the core legal obligations of states with respect to the protection of human rights of LGBT 
people include prohibiting discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation and gender 
identity. Canada may argue that the inability of LGBT people to fully wed in all U.S. states is 
in violation of this obligation. 
 28 The relevant resolutions condemn executions. They do not obligate countries to provide 
a right of same-sex marriage. 
 29 See “Joint Statement on Ending Acts of Violence and Related Human Rights Violations 
Based on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity”, presented to the U.N. General Assembly 
Dec. 18, 2008. 
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rights framework, countries that criminalize LGBT acts or do not recognize same 
sex unions have been told to change their laws during the Universal Periodic 
Review process. Several Special Rapporteurs commissioned by the HRCttee 
have made statements supportive of LGBT rights in their reports.30 
Canada may also attempt to argue that same-sex marriage, if not part of 
customary international law, is emerging as an obligation in the regional custom 
of North America. Canada and Mexico have legalized same-sex marriage, while 
in 2013 the U.S. has repealed the discriminatory Defense of Marriage Act, and a 
growing number of sub-federal jurisdictions are legalizing same-sex marriage 
across the country. Still, it is arguable that, in order for regional custom to be 
exist, there must be a common custom throughout the entire Americas. 
Currently, only Argentina, Brazil, Canada, and Mexico and the U.S, recognize 
the right to same-sex marriage federally compared to dozens of countries that do 
not, and North America has no common human rights framework. The U.S. may 
point to these facts as evidence that no regional custom exists. Canada may 
counter that in 2008 all 34 member countries of the Organization of American 
States - including the U.S. - unanimously approved a declaration affirming that 
human rights protections extend to sexual orientation and gender identity.31 
B. OFAC’s Blocking of the Sale of The Oscar Wilde 
The U.S. Office of Foreign Asset Control blocked the sale of The Oscar 
Wilde in order to prevent Chandra from making the ransom payment 
demanded for Hayter’s release. The parties dispute the legality of the block. 
This issue raises many questions about the definition of a “terrorist,” the scope 
of “terrorism,” and the competing claims of sovereignty and jurisdiction. 
1. Classifying Moses Andrew as a Pirate or Terrorist 
When determining if the U.S. Office of Foreign Asset Control’s (OFAC) 
blockage on the sale of The Oscar Wilde violates international law, the first issue 
to be addressed is whether Moses Andrew is a terrorist. The major argument of 
both parties will likely focus on Moses Andrew’s motive for kidnapping Bill 
Hayter. Traditionally, acts of piracy are recognized as being done for private 
 
 30 The HRCttee has held that States are not required, under international law, to allow 
same-sex couples to marry. Yet, the obligation to protect individuals from discrimination on 
the basis of sexual orientation extends to ensuring that unmarried same-sex couples are treated 
in the same way and entitled to the same benefits as unmarried opposite-sex couples. See 
Young v. Australia, Comm. No. 941/2000, U.N. GAOR Hum. Rts Comm., 78th Sess., U.N. 
Doc. CCPR/C/78/D/941/2000, para. 10.4 (2003). The HRCttee has welcomed measures to 
address discrimination in this context. In its concluding observations on Ireland, the 
Committee urged the State party to ensure that proposed Irish legislation establishing civil 
partnerships not be “discriminatory of non-traditional forms of partnership, including taxation 
and welfare benefits.” See “Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee on 
Ireland”, CCPR/C/IRL/CO/3, para. 8 (July 22, 2008). 
 31 “Human rights, sexual orientation and gender identity”, O.A.S. AG/RES. 2435 
(XXXVIII-O/08) (2008) expressing concern about violence directed toward LGBT people in 
the Americas and instructing the OAS’s Committee on Juridical and Political Affairs to 
include the resolution on its agenda when addressing the U.N. General Assembly. The 
document garnered support from Caribbean nations that criminalize homosexual acts. 
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ends;32 they are based on pecuniary gain with no discernible political ends. On 
the other hand, terrorism is motivated by political objectives that extend 
past the immediate attack. 33  Determining the motivation for kidnapping Bill 
Hayter and the likely purpose of the ransom money will be the key issue in 
deciding if Moses Andrew is a terrorist. 
According to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS) Article 101, piracy is defined as “illegal acts . . . committed for 
private ends . . . and directed . . . against another ship.”34 The key part of the 
definition that Canada will most likely focus on is that the act was done for 
“private ends,” a key distinction from most definitions of terrorism, which are 
viewed as acts done for political reasons.35 Private ends are generally understood 
to mean stealing money, cargo, and vessels for self-enrichment.36  A United 
States court, however, recently reviewed the definition of “private ends” in 
relation to piracy and concluded that private ends included actions undertaken on 
“personal, moral, or philosophical grounds.” 37  The court also noted that the 
perpetrators may consider their acts to be serving the public good, but this does 
not automatically mean that the ends are public.38 Canada will most likely argue 
that the kidnapping of Bill Hayter was done for the ransom payment and is thus 
an act of piracy, not terrorism. 
The U.S. will argue that Moses Andrew is in fact a terrorist, and the 
kidnapping of Bill Hayter was an act of terrorism. There is no internationally 
comprehensive or accepted definition of terrorism. 39  The UN describes 
terrorism as, “criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in 
the general public, a group of persons or particular persons for political 
purposes.”40 The Canadian Criminal Code defines acts of terrorism as acts done 
“in whole or in part for a political, religious or ideological purpose, objective or 
cause. 41  Finally, the United States Code defines terrorism as “premeditated, 
politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by sub-
national groups or clandestine agents . . . .”42 All three of these definitions state 
that terrorist acts are done for a political purpose. 
Moses Andrew identified himself as a member of the NLF in his ransom 
email, and indicated that Bill Hayter was being held by NLF guerillas. The goal 
of the NLF is political, and thus the U.S. may argue that the kidnapping of Bill 
Hayter and ransom demand are politically motivated. The NLF has been 
 
 32 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”), art. 101, Dec. 10, 
1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS]; Geneva Convention on the High Seas, art. 
15, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, 450 U.N.T.S. 82 [hereinafter Geneva Convention]. 
 33 Tina Garmon, International Law of the Sea: Reconciling the Law of Piracy and 
Terrorism in the Wake of September 11th, 27 TUL. MAR. L.J. 257, 258 (2002-2003). 
 34 UNCLOS, supra note 32, art. 101. 
 35 Garmon, supra note 33, at 258. 
 36 Id. at 146. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. 
 39 Garmon, supra note 33, at 269. 
 40 G.A. Res. 49/60, para. 31, U.N. Doc. A/RES/49/60 (Dec. 9, 1994). 
 41 Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s 83.01(1) (Can.). 
 42 22 U.S.C.A. § 2656f (d)(2) (West 2004). 
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designated as a terrorist organization on lists maintained by Public Safety 
Canada and the U.S. State Department.43 Finally, the U.S. could argue that the 
motive for the attack was not a simple financial gain, but a financial gain that 
will fund the ultimate goal of liberating the Namian Islands—the political goal 
of the NLF. Therefore, the kidnapping was an act of terrorism, not piracy. Still, 
there is no direct evidence that the payment, if made, would end up in the hands 
of terrorists, a point Canada is likely to emphasize. 
2. Does the projected ransom payment to the NLF constitute terrorist financing 
under international law? 
The International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of 
Terrorism (“Terrorism Financing Convention”) aims to avert terrorist activities by 
targeting financial sources; it criminalizes providing money to support terrorist 
groups and activities and requires signatories to prosecute or extradite such 
offenders. 44  Under Art. 2(1)(a), any act that constitutes an offence in the 
Convention’s nine annexed treaties is an act of terrorism.45 However, Art. 2(1)(b) 
states that acts other than the ones in Art. 2(1)(a) that may be covered by the 
Convention, but only if those acts “intended to cause death or serious bodily 
injury” with the purpose to “compel a government or an international 
organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.”46 
Canada will likely argue that the Terrorism Financing Convention annexes 
do not include piracy. Thus, if the Convention does not define piracy as 
terrorism in one of its annexes, then financing piracy would only be a violation if 
it satisfies Art. 2(1)(b)’s requirements. As discussed above, the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) Art. 101 defines piracy as an as 
any illegal act “of violence or detention . . . committed for private ends” against 
another vessel while on the high seas or in a country’s territorial waters.47 This 
conflicts with the text of Art. 2(1)(b) under which acts of terrorism must have a 
political, rather than private, motive.48 Under the UNCLOS definition, piracy 
would not satisfy Art. 2(1)(b)’s requirements, and financing piracy would not be a 
violation of the Terrorism Financing Convention. 
The United States, however, may counter that the Convention does include 
piracy in its terms. First, although Art. 2(1)(b) seems to eliminate piracy, Art. 
2(1)(a), and the treaties it references, could be read to incorporate such private acts 
of terrorism as piracy.49 The International Convention Against the Taking of 
 
 43 Id. 
 44 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, Oct. 30, 
2013, 2178 U.N.T.S. 197 [hereinafter ICSFT]. As of 2013, 132 countries have signed the 
Convention, including Canada and the United States. See also Pierre Klein, International 
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (2009), 
http://legal.un.org/avl/pdf/ha/icsft/icsft_e.pdf. 
 45 Id. at art. 2(1)(a). 
 46 Id. at art. 2(1)(b). 
 47 UNCLOS, supra note 32, art. 101. 
 48 ICSFT, supra note 44, art. 2(1)(b). 
 49 Andreas Kolb et al., Paying Danegeld to Pirates—Humanitarian Necessity or 
Financing Jihadists, 15 MAX PLANCK Y.B. OF U.N. LAW 105, 129 (2011) [hereinafter Kolb]. 
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Hostages, from 1979, and the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts 
against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, referenced by the Terrorism 
Financing Convention, both apply to piracy, a private act.50 Using this view, 
Art. 2(1)(a) could arguably include piracy as a terrorist act. 
The United States may also claim that paying the ransom is illegal under 
Art. 2 because the money could be used to fund further terrorism activity. Art 
2(1) makes it a crime to, directly or indirectly, provide any funds with the intent 
to further terrorism activity.51 Selling The Oscar Wilde and using the money for 
the ransom payment could give the NLF the necessary financing to continue its 
illegal actions. This could promote further kidnappings and piracy that, under 
the Convention, are terrorist-type activities. 
Even if the Terrorism Financing Convention does include piracy as an act of 
terrorism, paying ransoms for the release of hostages may not actually be an 
offence under the Convention. To violate Art. 2, not only must the financing go 
to an act defined in Art. 2(1(a)-(b), the payments must also be “unlawfully” 
provided or collected.52 If paying ransom to safely recover hostages constitutes a 
legal practice, then such payment would not be “unlawfully provided.” 
A 2010 African Union report proposing new measures to combat terrorism 
included a section that recommended a prohibition on ransom payments to 
terrorist groups, and “requested the international community to consider the 
payment of ransom to terrorist groups as a crime.”53 
This proposal could be taken to infer that the payment of a ransom is not a 
violation of the Convention. The Swiss Legislature, when adapting to the 
Convention, found even ransom payments that may fund terrorism could be 
justified.54 In Britain, sec. 15 of the Terrorism Act 2000 criminalizes fund-
raising for terrorist organizations. 55  However, in Masefield AG v. Amlin 
Corporate Member Ltd., the Court ruled that no legislation existed which 
criminalized ransom payments. 56  The Court also held that, since ransom 
payments can be recovered as “sue and labour expenses . . .  it cannot be against 
public policy . . . to pay a ransom.” 57  In Germany, paying a ransom may 
violate Section 129(a) of the Criminal Code, which deals with terrorist 
organizations.58 However, German citizens have been ransomed from pirates, 
suggesting that, when lives are at stake, ransom payments are allowable.59 Even 
 
 50 Id. at 129. 
 51 Id. at art. 2. 
 52 Id. at art. 2. 
 53 African Union, Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on Measures to 
Strengthen Cooperation in the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, African Union Peace 
and Security Council Doc. PSC/PR/2 (CCXLIX) 7 (Nov 22, 2010). 
 54 Kolb, supra note 49, at 136. 
 55 The Terrorism Act 2000, 2000, c. 3, §15. 
 56 Masefield AG v. Amlin Corporate Member Ltd., [2011] EWCA Civ. 24 63. 
 57 Id. para. 64. 
 58 Criminal Code [Germany], s. 159a, http://www.gesetze-im internet.de/englisch_stgb/
englisch_stgb.html. 
 59 James Macharia, Somali Pirates Free Tanker and Seize Cargo Ship, Reuters, Dec. 28, 
2010, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2010/12/28/uk-somalia-piracy-idUKTRE6BR0YP201012
28. 
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the United States seems to support the idea that ransom payments are legal. In 
Peters v. Warren Ins. Co., the United States Supreme Court held that ransom is a 
“necessary means of deliverance from a peril insured against, and acting directly 
upon the property.”60 These instances, along with the 2010 African Union report, 
could support Canada’s argument that ransom payments are not unlawful. 
The United States, however, may counter that, under U.S. law, the ransom 
payment is illegal. United States Executive Order 13536, implemented by 
President Barack Obama in April 2010, criminalizes any monetary contributions, 
including ransoms, to Somali pirates and those connected to the pirates.61 Since 
evidence suggests the NLF is connected to Somali pirates, paying the ransom 
to the NLF would violate the Executive Order. 
The ransom payment might also violate United Nations Security Council 
Resolution 1373, which came into force in 2001, before the Convention. 62 
Resolution 1373 was enacted soon after September 11, 2001, as a way of 
imposing uniform norms on all U.N. members. 63  Like the Convention, the 
Resolution prohibits funding terrorist groups and imposes an obligation to prevent 
such financing on states.64 Unlike the Convention, however, the Resolution is 
mandatory for all U.N. members, not just signatories.65 
Canada may argue that the Convention, adopted in 1999, is simply restated 
in Res. 1373. The Resolution was created to cover many of the same issues as 
the Convention, and was in part based on the Convention.66 
3. Does the Law of the Flag or the Law of the Jurisdiction in Which a Vessel is 
Located Prevail in the Event of a Conflict? 
According to the UNCLOS Art. 91(1), ships have the nationality of the 
State whose flag they fly. 67  Thus, the term “flag State” refers to the State 
whose nationality a ship bears.68 Here, The Oscar Wilde was flagged as a U.S. 
vessel. Generally, the nationality of a ship has three functions: it indicates (a) 
which State is permitted under international law to exercise its jurisdiction and 
control over the vessel; (b) which State is obliged to implement the duties listed 
in Art. 94 of UNCLOS and enforce national and international safety, labor, and 
environmental protection standards; and (c) which State is entitled to extend 
diplomatic protection to the vessel and its crew. Thus it is usually the flag state 
that is entitled to assert jurisdiction over its vessels. 
“Port state jurisdiction” refers to a legal relationship between the vessel and 
the sovereign territory in which the vessel is located, where the flag State is 
 
 60 Peters v. Warren Ins. Co, 39 U.S. 110 (1840). 
 61 Exec. Order No. 13,536, 75 Fed. Reg. 72 (April 15, 2010). 
 62 Matthew Happold, Security Council Resolution 1373 and the Constitution of the United 
Nations, 16 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 593, 594 (2003) [hereinafter Happold]. 
 63 Id. at 594. 
 64 S.C. Res. 1373, art. 1, 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001). 
 65 Happold, supra note 62, at 594. 
 66 Kolb, supra note 49, at 147. 
 67 UNCLOS, supra note 32, art. 91. 
 68 Id., art. 1. 
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different than the port State.69 On the basis of its territorial sovereignty, the port 
State may regulate the conditions for the access to and the stay of foreign vessels 
in its ports. Here, The Oscar Wilde was moored in Canadian territory, giving 
Canada port state jurisdiction. When the flag state and port state differ, as is the 
case here, competing claims for jurisdiction arise. The issue, then, is which 
jurisdiction prevails in the event of such a conflict. 
Canada asserts that the OFAC freeze is a violation of its rights as a port state 
to control chattels in its territory. UNCLOS recognizes that a state’s sovereignty 
extends to its territorial sea, and includes the ability to exercise full jurisdiction 
therein. UNCLOS Art. 2(1) states that the “sovereignty of a coastal State 
extends, beyond its land territory and internal waters and, in the case of an 
archipelagic State, its archipelagic waters, to an adjacent belt of sea, described as 
the territorial sea.”70 
The Oscar Wilde is within this territory described — it is moored in 
Vancouver — and, Canada will argue, is therefore subject to the sovereign 
control of Canada. “By entering a foreign port or foreign internal waters, 
a . . . ship and its crew comes temporarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the 
port State; it becomes subject to the laws and enforcement powers of that 
state.”71 As such, the vessel is subject to the laws of Canada. Furthermore, while 
The Oscar Wilde does fly the flag of the U.S., its only active owner resides within 
Canada and is a Canadian citizen. As such, he is entitled to place his own 
property up for sale, so long as this sale does not violate Canadian or 
international law. As per the Canadian Diplomatic Note issued to the United 
States, “the actions of OFAC were unwarranted in this instance since ‘the 
payment of a ransom is not contrary to international law.”72  This statement 
seems to suggest that, in addition to being legal under international law, the 
sale of The Oscar Wilde is regarded as legal according to Canadian law. 
Therefore, the OFAC’s blocking of the sale of The Oscar Wilde is ineffective as 
it violates Canada’s ability to control chattels within its sovereign territory. 
The exercise of port State jurisdiction, however, is not absolute. A distinction 
must be made with regard to the effects the activities on board the foreign vessel 
have on the port state’s territory or interests. 73  It is generally accepted that 
activities that affect coastal interests are subject to port State jurisdiction.74 The 
U.S. may argue that the abduction itself occurred in international waters. It would 
then follow that the flag State has jurisdiction over the vessel, as no port State can 
be said to have jurisdiction while the vessel is in international waters. 75  In 
addition, Canada and the U.S. both have a coastal interest in preventing 
 
 69 Id. para. 31. 
 70 UNCLOS, supra note 32, art. 2(1). 
 71 See UNCLOS, supra note 32, art. 11 (ports considered part of territorial sea) and art. 2 
(sovereignty extends to territorial sea). 
 72 Compromis, para. 23. 
 73 GEORGE C. KASOULIDES, PORT STATE CONTROL AND JURISDICTION: EVOLUTION OF THE 
PORT STATE REGIME (1993). 
 74 Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. 
v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 213. 
 75 UNCLOS, supra note 32, art. 87(1). 
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abductions off their respective coasts. Since the exact location of the abduction is 
unknown, both countries may have equally viable recourse with regard to coastal 
interest. The U.S. may emphasize this equality by pointing to the fact that it was 
a U.S. citizen, Bill Hayter, that was abducted. 
Furthermore, the U.S. may argue that it had the right to freeze the sale based 
on the text of the U.N. Charter itself. Article 103 of the U.N. Charter provides 
that: “In the event of a conflict between the Members of the United Nations 
under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international 
agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.”76 The OFAC 
Freeze was made pursuant to United Nations Security Council Res. 1373, which 
condemns terrorism financing. This Resolution was made under Chapter VII of 
the U.N. Charter and is binding on all U.N. member states. Accordingly, the 
U.S. will likely argue that, if completed, the sale of The Oscar Wilde would be 
used for the express purpose of paying ransom. This ransom would be paid to a 
member of a terrorist organization and thus finance future terrorist acts, a 
violation of Security Council Res. 1373. Because adhering to Res. 1373 conflicts 
with Canada’s assertion of port state jurisdiction and sovereignty under 
UNCLOS Art. 2, the U.S. will argue that obligations under Res. 1373 should 
prevail. 
 
 76 U.N. Charter art. 103. 
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